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I. INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 2013, David Lowery-frontman and a principal songwriter for
the alternative rock band Cracker-posted on The Trichordist, a blog dedicated to
promoting sustainable business models for artists in the Internet era.' Within
hours, major media outlets and small blogs alike discovered the post and
commented extensively on its message. 2 The post's title, My Song Got Played on
Pandora 1 Million Times and All I Got Was $16.89, Less Than What I Make Fmm a
Single T-Shirt Sale, 3 remains a succinct summary of the post's contents. Aided
with photographic evidence, Lowery revealed he received $16.89 in
4
compensation from Pandora Media, Inc. (Pandora) for streaming "Low"
5
1,159,000 times-a song he co-wrote.
To put Lowery's compensation into proper perspective, it is worth noting
that "Low" reached number three on Billboard's Alternative Songs Chart on
November 6, 1993,6 appeared on a major motion picture soundtrack, 7 and was
described as "a ubiquitous signpost of the alternative-as-the-new mainstream
era." 8 While other commentators claimed Lowery's post skewed information to
disfavor Pandora, 9 the attention given to the article demonstrated an important
point: The general public appears ready to admit that current business models
of Internet broadcasting and streaming services do not provide sustainable
income for songwriters to make a living from their craft.

ITHE TRiCHORDIST,http://www.thetrichordistcom (last visited Mar. 2,2016).
2 See Marc Hogan, Pandora Users Played David Lowery's Song a Milon Times and All He Got Was
$16.89, SPIN (June 24, 2013), http://www.spin.com/2013/06/pandora-david-lowery-cracker-lowroyalties-debate-streaming! (discussing David Lowery's blog post in the context of other
musicians who believe Pandora does not pay enough to rights holders).
3 David Lowery, My Song Got Played on Pandora 1 Milion Times andAllI Got Was $16.89, Less Than
What I Make From a Singk T-Shirt Sale, TI F, TmCHORISr (June 24, 2013), http://thetrichordist.
com/2013/06/24/my-song-got-played-on-pandora-1 -million-times-and-all-i-got-was-16-89-less-tha
n-what-i-make- from-a-single-t-shirt-sale/.
4 CRACKER, Low, on KEROSENE HAT (Virgin Records 1993).

5 Lowery, supra note 3.
6 Cracker Chart Histogy, BiLLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/arfist/299714/cracker/chart?
sort= position&f= 377 (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
7 VARIOUS ARTISTS, THE PERKS OF BEING A WALLFLOWER ORIGINAL MOTION PICTURE

SOUNDTRACK (Atlantic Records 2012).
8 David Menconi, Cracker Look Back at 20 Years of TLow,' SPIN 0an. 29, 2013), http://www.
spin.com/2013/01/cracker-low-david-lowery-oral-history/.
9 See Michael Degusta, Pandora Paid Over $1,300 for 1 Million Plays, Not $16.89, THE
UNDETSTATEMENT (June 25, 2013), http://theunderstatement.com/post/53867665082/pandorapays-far-more-than-16-dollars (explaining that because Lowery only owned 40% of the copyright
in the song and Pandora has to pay royalties for the sound recording of "Low," Pandora actually
paid $1,370 for 1,159,000 streams).
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Thirteen days prior to David Lowery's blog post, Pandora announced its
agreement to purchase KXMZ-FM (KXMZ), an FM radio station located in
Rapid City, South Dakota. 10 Radio and music industry experts recognized that
Pandora possessed no interest in purchasing the station to initiate an entrance
into the terrestrial radio market; KXMZ attracts an average audience of only
18,000.11 Pandora purchased KXMZ in an attempt to pay less to Performing
Rights Organizations (PROs) such as the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)organizations which license songwriters' catalogs, collect monies, and pay
12
member songwriters for public performances of their songs.
Pandora's attempt to secure lower royalty rates hinges on KXMZ's
association with the Radio Music Licensing Committee (RMLC). 13 The RMLC
represents the vast majority of broadcast radio stations in the United States
regarding "music licensing matters."'1 4 Radio broadcasters represented by the
RMLC pay ASCAP and BMI blanket license rates negotiated between the
RMLC and those individual PROs.' 5 These blanket license rates cover RMLC
members' over-the-air terrestrial broadcasts, as well as simultaneous noninteractive Internet broadcasts---either simulcasts of the terrestrial station or
non-interactive streaming services, similar to Pandora, which do not allow
listeners to choose specific songs to play.16 Importantly for Pandora,
10 Glenn Peoples, Pandora Bus TerrestrialRadio Station in South Dakota,Aims for Lower ASCAP
Royalties, BILLBOARD (une 11, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/
radio/1566479/pandora-buys-terrestrial-radio-station-in-south-dakota-aims-for.
11 Johnathan Chew, Here's Why Pandora Just Bought a Radio Station in South Dakota, FORTUNE
(une 16, 2015, 2:44 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/16/pandora-radio-south-dakota/; see also
Chris Castle, Tim Westergren's Mask is Slipping: Pandora's Scorched Earth Attack on Songwriters,
MusicTECHPOLICY (une 11, 2013), https://musictechpolicy.wordpress.com/2013/06/11/
tim-westergrens-mask-is-slipping-pandoras-scorched-carth-attack-on-songwriters/
(stating that
Pandora purchased KXMZ solely to pay songwriters less).
12 E.g., Peoples, supra note 10 ("Pandora acquired the station in an attempt to take advantage of
the royalty payment fees available to broadcast radio stations and Internet radio services operated
by owners of broadcast radio stations.'). See generally DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEEiD 'ro
KNOW ABOUT THiE Music BUSINESS 238-42 (8th ed. 2013) (outlining the role and duties of
Performing Rights Organizations).
13 See Peoples, supra note 10 (exploring Pandora's belief that association with an RMLC
member broadcaster should entitle it to rights under an RMLC license).
14 Our MAission, RADiO Music LICENSE COmm., http://www.radiomlc.com (last visited Oct. 5,
2015).
"5 COREY FILD & BARRY 1. SLOTNICK, Music Licensing in the Terrestrialand Di'talRadio Industries, in
ENT RTAiNMENT LAW: FORMS & ANALYsis 5.05 (2016); David Oxenford, What is the RMLC, and
Wy Should a Radio Station Pay Their Bill?, BROADCAST L BLOC,(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.broad
castlawblog.com/2012/08/articles/what-is-the-rmlc-and-why-should-a-radio-station-pay-their -bill/.
16 In rePandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aiffd sub nom., Pandora
Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015) ("In
addition, the 1.7 0% rate applies not only to simulcast radio stations that are streamed over the
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"terrestrial broadcasters [represented by the RMCL] who also operate webcasts
pay performing rights organizations (PROs) far less than companies who only
deliver content online."'1 7
Pandora purchased KIXMZ-a radio station
represented by the RMLC-in an attempt to avail itself of the station's RMLC
rate for digital broadcasts.1 8
In recent litigation between Pandora and BMI, Judge Louis Stanton of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York set
Pandora's blanket payment rate to BMI at 2.5% of Pandora's total revenuesubstantially higher than the 1.7% of total revenue RMLC members pay. 19
Pandora contested the ruling, stating its purchase of KXMZ-an RMLC
member--qualified Pandora for the 1.7% blanket license rate as an assignee of
KXMZ's RMLC license. 20
Recent settlements between Pandora and ASCAP and BMI created privately
negotiated blanket licensing rates and took the issue of Pandora's entitlement to
the RMLC rate out of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 21 While Pandora
may no longer attempt to exploit the RMLC rate, other digital broadcasters
might pursue a similar strategy to establish lower licensing rates. Examining the
history of Pandora's purchase of KXMZ and its use of the radio station to try
and achieve lower licensing rates provides guidance as to how other digital
broadcasters might pursue a similar strategy. The importance of creating a
sustainable market for artists grows every day. Songwriters like David Lowery
exemplify how current payment structures from digital broadcasters do not
allow artists to earn a living which enables them to continue creating. An
extensive solution to this issue remains outside the scope of this Note. What
can be said, however, is allowing digital broadcasters to pay the RMLC rate as a
result of purchasing a single terrestrial radio station would set dangerous
precedent. While on-demand services like Spotify grow in popularity daily, the
internet by terrestrial broadcasting RMLC members but also to programmed and customized
internet radio stations owned by RMLC members."); Peoples, supra note 10 ("A broadcaster... is
able to also offer a standalone, non-interactive Internet radio service that is covered by the RMLC
rates and deductions.").
17 E.g.,

Why Would PandoraPurchase an FM Radio Station?, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION June

13, 2013, 10:21 AM), https://futareofrnusic.org/blog/2013/06/13/why-would-pandora-purchas
e-fm -radio-station.
18 Peoples, supra note 10.

19Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69002, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 27, 2015), appeal docketed, Civ. No. 64-3783 (2d Cir. June 26,2015).
20 Beth Winegarner, PandoraDenied FM Radio Rate in BMI Royaly Row, LAw 360, July 29, 2015,
ansi/able at http;//v..law360.com/artidclo,/685050/Pandora denied fm radio rate in Gmik roya
Ity-row.
21 Pandora Signs Licensing Agreements with ASCAP and BMI, Webcaster to Drop Appeal of Recent BMI
Rate court Decision, ALL AcCmss (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.alaccess.com/net-news/archive/sto
ry/148815/pandora-signs-licensing-agreements-with-ascap-and-?ref=mail recap.
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continued use of non-interactive streaming services similar to Pandora, such as
Spotify Radio and Beats One means non-interactive streaming services remain
Allowing digital
an important avenue of exposure for songwriters.2
broadcasters to benefit from a bad-faith purchase of an FM radio station and
exploit a lower royalty rate would not only halt development of a sustainable
streaming culture, but would directly impede it.2 3
The first part of this Note explores songwriters' statutory right to public
performance royalties, the partnership between PROs and songwriters, and the
mechanism ASCAP and BMJ utilize to determine the rates private broadcasters
pay to stream songs. The second part of this Note provides a brief history of
Pandora's acquisition of KXMZ-FM, how the Southern District of New York
concluded Pandora should pay 2.5% of its revenue to BMI, Pandora's reasons
why its purchase entitles it to pay PROs the lower RMLC rate, and the
resolution of the controversy. The final part of the Note examines the dangers
of allowing digital broadcasters to utilize the RMLC rate-a rate designed for
broadcasters specializing in terrestrial radio who engage in minimal digital
broadcasting 4-- and the need for Congress to promulgate regulations to
prevent other non-interactive streaming services from engaging in similar bad
faith purchases to exploit lower public performance rates.
II. BACKGROUND
For songwriters at any level of success, public performance royalties remain
a substantial, and most importantly, consistent source of revenue throughout

22 See Glenn Peoples, New Report Looks at U.S. Streamin& Finds Pandora the Clear Leader,
BILLBOARD (Mar. 5, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.biflboard.com/articles/business/6494341/infi

nite-dial-us-music-streaming report; Rick Stella, Who Picks the Best Songs? We Test Pandora,Spotif,
Beats Music, Rdio, and iTunes Radio, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.digitaltrends.
("Right off the bat
com/music/pandora-spotify-beats-rdio-itunes-radio-algorithm-comparison/
it's easy to see Pandora features the thinnest library of songs, yet it's widely considered the
seasoned veteran of Internet radio and maintains massive popularity.").
23 See Get the Facts: Pandora Buys FM Radio Station in Bid to Undercut Songwriters, AM. SoC'Y OF
COMPOSERS, AUTI JORS AND PUBLISI n-RS (May 29, 2015), http://www.ascap.com/playback/2013
/ 06/action/pandora-buys-fm-radio-station -in-a-bid-to-undercut- songwriters.aspx (comparing
terrestrial FM radio broadcasts with online streaming services such as Pandora to explain why
streaming services should pay greater public performance royalties to songwriters).
24 See PandoraRadio Station Buy Doesn't GuaranteeLower Rights Rate, Lanyers Sg, WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, May 1, 2015, at LEXIS ADVANCE ("[An ASCAP spokeswoman] said the RMLC 'was
designed for businesses that earn more than 95 percent of revenue from traditional AM/ FM
radio advertising, not a huge online music company that buys a radio station with 18,000
listeners.'").
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their careers. 25
The allocation of public performance royalties, which
compensate songwriters when businesses or individuals play their songs in
public locations, evolved through a combination of free market commerce and
court doctrine. 26 These royalty calculation mechanisms reflect many factors,
including how many listeners a broadcast reaches and how many songs a
broadcaster plays in a given day. 27 Due to settlement, the court will not have an
opportunity to decide whether Pandora's purchase of an FM radio station
entitles it to the lower public performance rate paid by terrestrial broadcasters.
Without a clear legal standard, other digital broadcasters might attempt similar
bad faith purchases to avail themselves of a lower terrestrial radio rate designed
for AM and FM radio stations, which play substantially less music and reach far
fewer people than digital broadcasters.
A. SONGWRITER PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS AND PERFORMING RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS

Under the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), a terrestrial broadcaster
(such as KXMZ-FM) or a web-based broadcaster (such as Pandora) publicly
performs a song when it plays the song over-the-air or streams it online. 28
Public performance of a song implicates two separate and legally protectable
copyrights. 29 The first copyright covers the song arrangement itself: the song's
underlying music and lyrics. 30 This copyright defaults to the songwriter or
songwriters, who typically license the composition to a publisher to
administer. 31 The second copyright covers the sound recording of the musical

25 Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Performing Right Payments, TIHE AM. SOC'Y OF COMPOSERS,
AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS (2008), http://www.ascap.com/music-career/articles-advice/music-

money/money-payments.aspx ("One of the greatest sources of long-and short-term income for
songwriters and publishers in the royalty money received from performing rights societies around
the world.").
26 Seegeneral4 FIELD & SLOTNiCK, supra note 15 (providing a brief history of PROs).
27 ASCAP Payment Syster. Introduction, THrE AM. SOC'Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND
PUBLISHERS, http://www.ascap.com/members/payment (last visited May 22, 2016).
28 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it,
either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.... To perform or display a work 'publicly' means ....
(2) to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance or display of the work .... ).
29 See COREY FIELD & BARRY I. SLOTNICK, Copyright Ownership in the Music Industry, in
ENTERTAINMENT LAW: FORMS & ANALYSIS, supra note 15, 5 4.02 ("Any music transaction
involving sound recordings requires the lawyer to peel back the layers of copyright ownership in
sound recording and to identify its two main components .... ").

- 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
31 ENTERTAINMENT LAW: FORMS & ANALYSIS,

supra note 15.
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composition. 32 This copyright defaults to the artists creating the recording and
typically gets assigned to the artists' record label.33 Although the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 199534 amended the Copyright
Act to acknowledge public performance rights in sound recordings broadcast
over digital transmission, Pandora's purchase of KXMZ and its negotiations
with BMI implicates the songwriters' public performance interests, since it
involves licensing rates paid to PROs. The Copyright Royalty Board oversees
the statutory rate Pandora pays to sound recording owners, 35 a topic outside the
scope of this Note.
The Copyright Act grants songwriters the right to control public
performances of their compositions. 36 Although songwriters reserve the right
to negotiate public performance royalty rates with individual broadcasters, the
volume of broadcasters within the United States prevents this from being a
37
practical option.
Commercial songwriters overcome the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
38
directly licensing their songs for public performance by engaging PROs.
Songwriters, typically represented by their publisher, enroll with a particular
PRO. 39 Each PRO then negotiates with broadcasters (or their representatives)
that publicly perform its songs. The most common type of agreement reached
is the nonexclusive blanket license. 40 Blanket licenses allow terrestrial and
digital broadcasters--or other public performers of songs-to play any of the
licensor PRO's registered songs for an annual fee. 41 The PROs examine
broadcasters' play logs and music detection data to allocate funds among
registered songwriters in proportion with the number of times their songs get

32

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7).

33 ENTRTAINNENT LAW: FOIMS & ANAEYSIS, supra note 15.
34 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995,

Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat.

336 (1995).

35 Bruce 11. Kobayashi, Opening Pandora'sBlack Box: A Coasian 1937 View of Performance Rights
Oganizationsin 2014, 22 Gto. MASON L. RE;v. 925, 929-30 (2015) ("Non-interactive transmission
services, where uscri can tailor by gcrc the songs that arc streamed to them, but cannot choose a
specific sound recording, are required to pay a statutory license fee ... determined by a schedule
set by the Copyright Royalty Board ('CRB3).'.
36 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
37 FiLD & SLOrNICK, supra note 15 ("IThere are 15,196 AM/FM Terrestrial stations in the
United States and many more [digital radiol services. No copyright owner has the resources or
time to conclude licensing agreements with thousando of individual radio cervicec for each cong
performed."); PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 238.
38 See generally Kobayashi, supra note 35, at 926-28 for a discussion of the necessities of PROs
and whether they are still necessary for all types of media.
39 PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 238.
40 F1.LD & SLOTNICK, supra note 15; PASSMAN, supranote 12, at 238.
41 PASSMORI, supra note 12, at 238-39.
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played. 42 In the United States, the three major PROs are ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC (which formerly stood for Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers). 43 ASCAP and BMI represent approximately 97% of songwriters
registered with a PRO; SESAC represents the remaining 3% of songwriters
registered with a PRO. 44
Because ASCAP and BMI held a majority of the public performance rights,
the United States government, concerned about a monopoly on performing
rights, brought suits against ASCAP and BMI in 1941. 45 These suits resulted in
the creation of consent decrees: mechanisms established by the Department of
Justice which regulate the rates ASCAP and BMI charge for their catalogues."
The ASCAP and BI consent decrees were amended in 2001 and 1994,
respectively. 47 SESAC currently operates without any consent decree."8
These decrees mandate ASCAP and BMI to offer public performance
licenses to any entity, such as the RMLC or a PRO, which requests them at fair
and non-discriminatory rates. 49 Should negotiations between the PRO and any
entity fail, either party may call upon a rate court designated in the PRO's
consent decree to establish a fair rate following litigation.50 At trial, the PRO
bears the burden of proof to show it offered an appropriate rate.5' The ASCAP
and BMI consent decrees both name the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York as the rate setting court 5 2 If the PRO fails to
meet its burden of proof, "the rate court judge seeks to set a reasonable royalty
rate that reflects the outcome of a hypothetical negotiation, taking into account
the fact that the rate court hearings exist as a result of the [PROs] position as
'monopolies exercising disproportionate power over the market for music
42 Id at 239-40.
43 Id.at 238-39.
44 Id at 238.
45 Antitrust Consent Decree Retiew - ASCAP and BM 2014, U.S. DEPsr oF JusTcE, http://www.

justice.gov/atr/ascap-bmi-decrec-review (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
46 Id
47 United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June
11, 2001); United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).
48 In rePandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 6 F. Supp. 3d
317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), affd sub nom., Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors
& Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015).
49 United States v. ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23707, at *17-18; United States v. Broad.
Music, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, at *2.
50United States v. ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23707, at *17-18; United States v. Broad.
Music, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, at *2.
51 United States v. ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23707, at *18; United States v. Broad.
Music, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, at *3.
52 United States v. ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23707, at *18; United States v. Broad.
Music, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, at *3; FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 15.
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rights.' ",53 This system, although complex, assures that broadcasters pay a rate
that fairly compensates songwriters based on a broadcaster's size, outreach, and
the total number of songs it plays, while remaining reasonable enough to
incentivize broadcasters to continue their business operations.
B. PANDORA'S ACQUISITION OF KXMZ-FM AND ITS STRATEGY TO ADJ UST
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE ROYALTY RATES
54
Pandora publicly announced its purchase of KXMZ-FM on June 11, 2013.
55
FCC laws, however, prevented finalizing the purchase for almost two years.
Specifically, Pandora faced strict FCC regulations regarding when companies
with "significant" foreign ownership can purchase radio stations.5 On May 4,
2015, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling holding that Pandora could remain up
to 49.99% foreign owned and purchase KXMZ if it continued to meet FCC
established qualifications.5 7 In spite of ASCAP's public protests against the
purchase, the FCC chose to focus solely on the issue of foreign ownership,
stating that copyright and licensing issues raised by the purchase are "more
appropriately resolved through Congress, the courts and other government
agencies."s8
The first litigation following Pandora's announcement that it planned to
purchase KXMZ occurred between ASCAP and Pandora.5 9 Following
litigation, District Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York set
the licensing rate between ASCAP and Pandora at 1.85% of Pandora's
revenue. 60 During litigation, Pandora attempted to utilize its deal with KXMZ
to attain a 1.7 % licensing fee, the rate RMLC affiliated broadcasters like KXMZ
pay PROs. However, Cote did not factor Pandora's purchase of KXMZ into
61
his holding as the purchase remained under FCC investigation at the time.

53 Kobayashi, supra note 35, at 933 (quoting United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 426 F.3d 91,
96 (2d Cir. 2005)).
54 Peoples, supra note 10.
5 Bill Donahue, FCCAllows Pandora To Buy FM Radio Station, LAw360 (May 5, 2015, 4:09 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/651819/fcc-allows-pandora-to-buy-fm-radio-station.
56 Id
57 Id.; see general In re Pandora Radio LLC, 30 FCC Rcd. 5094, 5099 (promulgating the
conditions upon which Pandora may purchase KXMZ-FM).
58 In rePandora Radio LIC,30 FCC Rcd. 5094, 5099.
59 See generaly In rePandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (detailing the
licensing rates between ASCAP and Pandora through the end of 2015).
60 Id at 320.
61 See id. at 349 n.52 ('Tandora's purchase of KXMZ-FM remains pending. ASCAP has
petitioned the FCC to deny the transfer of the station's FCC license to Pandora.').
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Judge Cote concluded Pandora's operations, on their face, did not show enough
62
similarity to other RMLC licensees to support the 1.7% RMLC rate.
The next round of rate court litigation occurred between BMI and
Pandora. 63 As it had in the ASCAP litigation, Pandora asserted that "it is
comparable, and should receive treatment similar to, that afforded thousands of
broadcast radio stations who are represented by the Radio Music Licensing
Committee and pay a rate of 1.7%. "64 Yet, like Judge Cote's holding in the
ASCAP litigation, Judge Stanton did not factor Pandora's purchase of KXMZ
into his holding. Instead, he held Pandora users' ability to customize stations
based on artists or songs and Pandora's relative lack of disc jockey commentary
and advertisements compared to AM and FM radio separated it from traditional
terrestrial radio stations represented by the RMLC---even stations who maintain
non-interactive web broadcasts similar to Pandora. 65 Judge Stanton utilized
these factors and set the licensing rate between BMI and Pandora at 2.5% of
Pandora's revenue. 66
Just weeks before the litigation between BMI and Pandora ended, the FCC
approved Pandora's purchase of KXMZ. 67 The purchase closed on June 9,
2015,68 barely a week after Judge Stanton's decision. With its purchase of
KXMZ approved by the FCC and finalized, Pandora filed a Motion to Alter
Judgment 69 In the motion, Pandora stated it now stood as assignee of
KXMZ's RMLC negotiated licensing rate with BMi for terrestrial and new
media transmissions.7 0 Pandora asserted that-as a result of its status as
assignee-its web broadcasts are entitled to the 1.7% RMLC rate KXIMZ pays
to perform BMI's catalogue.7' A month later, Justice Stanton responded to
Pandora's motion stating only, "Pandora's motion to alter or amend the

62 Id.at 371 ("In light of these similarities, the question that is fairly presented by Pandora's
application is whether it is entitled ...to the RMLC rate. The answer to that question, while
close, is no." (footnotes omitted)).
63 See generally Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69002
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2015), appealdocketed, Civ. No. 64-3783 (2d Cir., June 26, 2015) (detailing the
licensing rates between BMI and Pandora through the end of 2016).
64 Id. at *52.
65

Id.at *53-55.

66 Id.at *4.
67

In re Pandora Radio LLC, 30 FCC Rcd. 5094.

68 Memorandum in Support of Pandora's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Broad.

Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., Civ. No. 13-4037 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2015), ECF No. 247.
69

Id

Id. ("Pandora is now the assignee of Connoisseur Media, LLC's 2012 Radio Statement
License Agreement for KXMZ (the 'BMI-KXMZ License')").
71 Id ("Under the plain language of the RMLC agreement, Pandora's non-simulcast internet
radio transmission are thus licensed under the BMI-KXMZ License through December 31, 2016,
the end of the term of the BMI-KXMZ License.').
70
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judgment dated June 29, 2015 (Dkt. No. 246) is denied. ' 72 Pandora then
submitted a motion for appeal. 73 Before the appeal could be heard, however,
Pandora reached settlements with ASCAP and BML While both settlements
remain confidential, spokespersons for Pandora stated that the broadcaster
negotiated flexible licensing rates with ASCAP and BMI, and agreed with
74
withdraw its appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Although the settlement remains confidential, the act of settling indicates
that Pandora, a long-established and well-known digital broadcaster, will not use
its purchase of KXMZ-FM as collateral to attain the RMLC royalty rate. Other
digital broadcasters might interpret Pandora's settlement as a sign that the
terrestrial acquisition strategy will not work in the future. The possibility
remains, however, that less established digital broadcasters might engage in a
similar bad-faith purchase to save money by lowering public performance
royalty payments.
III. ANAJYSIS
At this time, Congress holds the responsibility of making sure digital
broadcasters do not engage in the type of bad faith purchases Pandora
attempted in the future. This section proposes two possible plans Congress
could implement to address this issue, one based on trademark law and one
based on economics. These plans would prevent digital broadcasters from
purchasing terrestrial radio stations solely to lower their royalty payment
obligations, while assuring that digital broadcasters with legitimate hopes of
entering the terrestrial radio market may move forward without fear of
complication or legal action. Only when Congress addresses this issue, will
PROs and broadcasters be able to negotiate under the conditions of complete
honesty and good faith to reach license rates that reflecting the current digital
broadcast market.
A. THeE DANGER OF ALLOWING DIGITAL BROADCASTERS' PURCHASES OF

TERRESTRIAL RADIO STATIONS TO ENTITLE THEM TO THE RMLC BROADCAST
RATE

Pandora's purchase of KXMZ did not, in and of itself, present any troubling
issues; rather, concerns arise from the motives behind that purchase. Pandora

72 Order on Motion to Alter Judgment, Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc-, Civ. No.
134037 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2015), ECF No. 251.
73 Notice of Appeal, Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., Civ. No. 13-4037 (S.D.N.Y.
May 27, 2015), ECF. No. 252.
74 A-u- AccEss, supra note 21.
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purchased the station not out of desire to establish itself as a terrestrial
broadcaster, but as a purely strategic move to claim association with the RM4LC
and avail itself of the RMLC's more favorable rate for terrestrial broadcasters
when negotiating with PROs.

75

An ASCAP press release issued shortly after

Pandora announced its plans to purchase KXMZ characterized the purchase
accurately: "[A] stunt... [Pandora] hope[s] to use KXMZ as a bargaining chip
in their relentless quest to pay lower royalty rates for their online music
streams." 76

Pandora's recent settlements took out of litigation the issue of

whether a solely online broadcaster may purchase a single terrestrial radio
station to entitle its digital broadcasts to lower public performance royalty rates.
The issue remains an open legal question. While this may seem like an
extremely specific, even trivial, issue, an overview of current music industry
trends reveal this issue's great importance.
David Lowery exemplifies the fact that Pandora does not pay enough for
artists to sustain their craft professionally. Under current licensing rates,
7
Pandora pays PROs approximately eight cents for every 1,000 plays of a song. 7
This compensation may have been adequate in previous decades, when digital
broadcasts of music were a niche market and physical sales and downloads of
songs accounted for a majority of a songwriter's income. Physical sales and
downloads of music, however, continue to decline yearly as non-interactive
internet based broadcasters such as Pandora evolve into a primary means of
music consumption.78 As consumers move toward web-based broadcasting of
music, songwriters' income from Pandora and similar services should reflect
this shift.
Licensing rates that fairly compensate songwriters in accordance with the
growing use of web-based broadcasting will occur most efficiently through
frequent and continuing negotiations between PROs and broadcasters, such as
Pandora, whose income derives solely or predominantly from digital broadcasts.
Because negotiations run the risk of failure, the rate courts serve as a last resort
mechanism to establish licensing rates that reflect, among other factors, how

75In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
76 ASCAP Fiks FCC Petition to BlAck Pandora's Radio Station Bid, AM. SOC'Y OF COMPOSERS,
AuTHORS AND PUBLISIH[ERS (uly 29, 2013), http://www.ascap.com/playback/2013/O7/wecreate
music/ascap- files-petition-against-pandora-with-the-fcc.aspx.
n Id.
78 See Peter Kafka, The Music Business's Song Is on Repeat: StreamingIs Up, Saks Are Flat,RE/CODE
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://recode.net/2015/09/21/the-music-businesss-song-is-on-repeat-streamin
g-is-up-sales-are-flat/ ("The more interesting picture comes when you look at the makeup of
digital sales, where download sales from Apple are being replaced by subscription revenue from
Spotify and other subscription services, as well as revenue from free services like Pandora.").
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consumers listen to music. 79 Allowing a digital broadcaster's purchase of a
single rural radio station to entitle it to the RMLC rate-a rate "designed for
businesses that earn more than 95 percent of revenue from traditional AM/FM
radio advertising"81 -would freeze the public performance license rate at 1.7%.
If allowed to utilize that rate, digital broadcasters would pay songwriters the
same amount as radio stations that currently play substantially less music than
these services, 81 in spite of the fact that digital broadcasters gain a larger
audience and stream more songs daily. Put simply, Pandora's purchase of
KXMZ exemplified a bad faith purchase that could hamper open and fair
negotiations between PROs and web-based broadcasters in the future.
B. CONGRESS CAN ESTABLISH A STANDARD TO PREVENT FUTURE WEB-BASED
BROADCASTERS FROM EXPLOITING THE RMLC LICENSING RATE

Because Pandora withdrew its appeal from the rate court's order in its
litigation with BMI, the Second Circuit did not have an opportunity to decide
whether the purchase of a single terrestrial radio station entitles a digital
broadcaster to the RMLC license rate on its digital broadcasts. In its argument
at trial, Pandora argued that its service is analogous to iHeartRadio, a noninteractive web-based broadcast platform maintained by iHeartMedia. Judge
Stanton responded to this argument stating that "the analogy fails:
ileartMedia... operates hundreds of terrestrial radio stations in addition to its
iHeartRadio service." 82 Perhaps the Second Circuit would have reasoned
likewise and denied Pandora the RMLC rate, but this remains speculative.
Instead, any policy or regulation on this issue should come from Congress.
The imperative question concerns what type of standard should be
implemented? A complete bar on digital broadcasters attaining a lower license
rate though purchase of terrestrial radio stations creates negative incentives for
web broadcasters who may legitimately wish to enter the terrestrial radio
broadcast market.
Without congressional action, however, a worse alternative would occur.
Digital broadcasters will continue to engage in bad faith acquisitions of
In this
terrestrial broadcasting entities in an attempt to save money.
environment, PROs and digital broadcaster will feel hesitant to negotiate
79 United States v. ASCAP, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23707, at *17-18; United States v. Broad.
Music, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, at *2.
80 PandoraRadio Station Buy Doesn't GuaranteeLower Rights Rate, Lawyers Say, supra note 24.
81 See Get the Facts:PandoraBuys FM Radio Station in Bid to UndercutSongwriters, supra note 23 ("By

10 am every morning, Pandora has already performed 200 million songs, as compared to the
hundreds of songs played by the average radio station in an entire day.").
82 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69002, at *55 (S.D.N.Y.
May 27, 2015), appealdocketed,Civ. No. 64-3783 (2d Cir.,June 26, 2015).
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directly, and will rely on already overburdened courts to mandate licensing rates.
These court mandated rates do not allow for the flexibility that results from
direct negotiations between parties. In this situation, the songwriters will suffer
most, since they will continue to receive sub-standard payments for the
broadcast of their work to millions of listeners around the world.
One potential solution lies in trademark law. Under the Lanham Act, an
individual may file an application for a trademark given a good-faith intention
to utilize the mark in commerce 83 and willingness to provide, at later times,
continued evidence of such use.84 Utilizing this model, a digital broadcaster,
upon purchase of a terrestrial radio station broadcasting under an RMLC
license, may be entitled to the RMLC rate under the condition it shows a good
faith intention to enter the terrestrial broadcast market and will continue to
show attempts to enter the terrestrial broadcast market. Failure to meet these
standards would result in the digital broadcaster defaulting to a higher PRO
blanket license rate designed for primarily digital broadcasters.
A second standard could allow web-based broadcasters to lower their
negotiated or court ordered PRO licensing fees in proportion to the percent of
their audience that listens to the acquired AM/FM terrestrial radio stations.
Using Pandora's acquisition of KXMZ as an example, KXMZ would lower
Pandora's license rates to ASCAP and BMI by the percent KXMZ's average
audience-approximately 18,000 5 -comprises Pandora's total audience of
approximately 80 million. The more terrestrial stations a digital broadcaster
acquires, the more its rate will lower. Additionally, amassing terrestrial radio
stations would give digital broadcasters a more even split of terrestrial and
digital listeners, making these broadcasters more analogous to entities like
iHeartRadio and justifying the lower licensing rates.
The ways consumers access music changes rapidly as the trend towards
digital consumption continues. 86 To ensure that songwriters receive adequate
compensation for their craft, PROs and digital broadcasters must be in a
relationship that supports quick and honest negotiations to account for
changing listener habits. By promulgating one, or both, or these proposed
83 15 U.S.C. 5 1051(b) (2012) ("A person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances
showing the good faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce may request registration
of its trademark .... .
4 Id. § 1051(d).
85 Chew, supranote 11.
86 See Ed Christman, U.S. Recording Industry Sees Sight Uptick in Revenue Last Year, Streaming
Dominates Digital,BILLBOARD (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7271
729/riaa-us-recording-2015-revenue-numbers ("The RJAA notes that, for the first time,
streaming revenue accounted for 34.3 percent of the industry's revenue last year. Compare that
to download sales, which made up 34 percent of revenues, physical with 28.8 percent, and synch
at 2.9 percent, and the primacy of streaming starts to become clear.").
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standards, Congress would eliminate another loophole digital broadcasters
might seek to lower royalty payments designed for terrestrial broadcasts. As
Congress fills more of these loopholes, PROs and digital broadcasters will have
no desire to turn to rate court to establish licensing rates, and will engage in
direct, good faithful negotiations. If PROs and digital broadcasters feel more
comfortable negotiating frequently, songwriters will not suffer unfair royalty
payments during this time of change in the music industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
Creation of a good faith standard or lowering web-broadcasters' negotiated
or court ordered licensing fee in proportion to the audience it gains from
terrestrial purchases provides benefits for songwriters and the broadcasting
industry in general. Web-based broadcasters receive clear guidance regarding
what actions they need to take to qualify for the RMLC rate, thereby eliminating
the motivation for web broadcasters to initiate bad faith purchases of small
terrestrial broadcasters in hopes of exploiting the RMLC rate. Additionally,
broadcasters may engage in cost-benefit analysis, determining whether the
outlay of capital to purchase terrestrial stations can be recouped by savings
gained through licensing fee reductions.
With clear guidelines established, negotiations between PROs and webbased broadcasters will become more transparent and less combative, resulting
in less cases being sent to rate court and lowering the burden on an already
loaded docket. Most importantly, these standards assure that songwriters
receive fair compensation based upon broadcasting medium and audience as
the transition to digital consumption of music continues. Finally, songwriters
like David Lowery will receive fair compensation when their songs are
broadcast to millions of listeners around the country.
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